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INTRODUCTION
Take out a pencil and a piece of paper. Now write down the
number five and put fourteen zeros after it. Now, going from right to
left, place a comma after every three zeros. Finally, put a dollar sign in
front of the number. Now, look at the number.
$500,000,000,000,000.
Five Hundred Trillion Dollars. To the majority of the public, that
amount of money is the equivalent of "a million bajillion" dollars. It is
more than thirty-three times the 2011 Gross Domestic Product of the
United States 1 and, if stacked in $100 dollar bills, would be taller than
(and consume) the Empire State Building. 2 However, five hundred
trillion dollars is the amount of money that was left in the hands of
greedy investment bankers looking to make a quick buck. How? Since
its institution, the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") has been
left unregulated. As a result, a few greedy individuals manipulated the
rate for their own financial advantage at the expense of every individual
who has ever taken out a loan. And how much money does LIBOR
affect? Five Hundred Trillion Dollars.
LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate that reflects the cost of
borrowing for banks and has been used to set an estimated $500 trillion
worth of financial instruments. 3 A number of banks have been accused
I.

at
available
BANK,
WORLD
THE
US$),
(current
GDP
1. See
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
2. See generally US Debt Ceiling Visualized in $100 Bills, DEMONOCRACY INFO,
available at http://demonocracy.info/infographics/usa/us_debt/us_debt.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2013).
3. See Heidi N. Moore, LIBOR for Mortals: An Easy Explainer, MARKETPLACE (July
3, 2012, 3:40 PM), available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/easy-street/libormortals-easy-explainer (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/6

2

Weldon: The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal & The Wheatley Review: A Band-Aid

2013]

The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal

201

of attempting to manipulate LIBOR from 2005 through 2009. 4 The
manipulation stemmed from two sources: ( 1) derivative traders,
colluding with counterparts at other banks in attempting to manipulate
LIBOR submissions to boost individual trading profits; and (2)
executive level focused 'decisions' or collaborations to falsely lower
LIBOR submissions in order to give an artificial impression of sounder
financial strength. 5
Out of the potential twenty banks believed to be involved, to date,
only UBS and Barclays have admitted rate manipulation and false
reporting. 6 Subsequently, Barclays negotiated a $450 million settlement
which was divided amongst the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Financial Services
Authority. 7 To date, the U.K. and the U.S. criminal investigations have
been led by the Serious Fraud Office and the Department of Justice,
respectively. 8
While much of the focus thus far has been on the actions taken by
governments and regulators, this Note will focus on the institution and
history ofLIBOR, the manipulation ofLIBOR from 2005 through 2009,
and the evidence supporting collusion between banks to manipulate
LIBOR. Furthermore, this Note will examine a regulation proposal and
recommendations to the LIBOR system by Martin Wheatley, a top U.K.
regulator, and how his proposal fails to address the culture of the
banking system. Finally, this Note will propose the creation of a
"whistle blowing" incentive system to be instituted along with a
4. See James O'Toole, Explaining the Libor Interest Rate Mess, CNNMONEY (July 10,
2012, 12:07 PM), available at http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /03/investing/libor-interestrate-faq/index.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
5. See Halah Touryalai, Regulators Instructed Barclays to Lower Libor: Del Missier
Testifies,
FORBES
(July
16,
2012,
1:42
PM),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/07I 16/regulators-instructed-barclays-tolower-libor-del-missier-testifies/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see also James O'Toole,
Winners and Losers in Libor Mess, CNNMONEY (July 12, 2012, 5:10 AM), available at
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07 /12/investing/libor-consumers/index.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2013).
6. See UBS Fined $1.5B over Libor Manipulation, FoxBUSINESS (Dec. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/ l 2/l 9/ubs-fined- l 5b-over-libormanipulation/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
7. See Barclays Will Pay $450Mfor Manipulation Interest Rates, USA TODAY (July
available
at
27,
2012)
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/story/2012-06-27 /barclayspenalty/55854212/1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
8. See id.; see also Jill Treanor, Serious Fraud Office to Investigate Libor
Manipulation,
GUARDIAN
(London)
(July
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co. uk/business/20 l 2/jul/06/serious-fraud-office-libor-investigation
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013 ).

Published by SURFACE, 2013

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6

202

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

regulatory overhaul of the LIBOR system.
Part II of this Note will provide background information on
LIBOR, specifically how LIBOR is calculated and how it affects any
person who takes out a loan. Part III of this Note will present an
overview of the LIBOR manipulation through investigation into
Barclays Bank, specifically through violations found by regulatory
authorities and the settlement between Barclays and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Part IV of this Note will
display evidence suggesting that LIBOR submitting banks colluded to
manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis. Part V of
this Note will discuss Martin Wheatley's proposed reforms to the
LIBOR system and the reaction it received from the public. Part VI of
this Note will discuss the problems within Wheatley's regulation
scheme, specifically its failure to account for the banking culture among
LIBOR submitting banks.
Finally, Part VII of this Note will
recommend reform for LIBOR and the institution of "whistle blowing"
incentives for LIBOR submitting banks.
II.
LIBOR
This section provides background information on LIBOR. Part A
defines LIBOR and how it is calculated, while Part B discusses what
information is taken from LIBOR and how it affects any common
person that takes out a loan.
A. What is LJBOR?

LIBOR is an interest rate set in London through submissions of
lending rates by eighteen major banks. 9 The submission by each bank is
a calculation of how much interest each bank would have to pay to
borrow from one of the other banks. 10 The British Bankers' Association
("BBA"), with assistance from the Foreign Exchange and Money
Markets Committee, selects the specific banks that will submit rates for
the calculation of LIBOR based on the bank's market volume,

9. Moore, supra note 3. The complete list of all 18 banks that contributed to fixing
LIBOR are as follows: (I) Bank of America, (2) Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd, (3)
Barclays Bank PLC, (4) BNP Paribas, (5) Citibank NA, (6) Credit Agricole CIB, (7) Credit
Suisse, (8) Deutsche Bank AG, (9) HSBC, (10) JP Morgan Chase, (11) Lloyds Banking
Group, (12) Rabobank, (13) Royal Bank of Canada, (14) Societe Generale, (15) Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation, ( 16) The Norinchukin Bank, ( 17) The Royal Bank of Scotland
Group, and (18) UBS AG. US Dollar Panel, BBALIBOR (May 2012), available at
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
10. Moore, supra note 3.
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reputation, and assumed knowledge of the currency concerned. 11 The
selection of banks occur each year, but rarely result in any change. 12
Many well-known banks such as Bank of America, Barclays, JPMorgan
Chase, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC are among the banks selected by the
BBA. 13
The use of LIBOR can be traced back to the late 1960's, when the
rate that banks used to borrow money was set and governed by a "small
Minos A.
group of like-minded bankers" based in London. 14
Zombanakis, a former banker at Manufacturers Hanover, recalls the first
LIB OR loan, an $80 million loan extended by a group of banks to Iran.
He explained, "we had to fix a rate, so I called up all the banks and
asked them to send to me by 11 a.m. their cost of money. We got the
rates, I made an average of them all and I named it the London
interbank offered rate." 1 For the next fifteen years, the banks set the
rate at which banks could lend to each other roughly as Zombanakis
described. 16 Although this may be shocking in today's financial world,
there was a trust amongst bankers that they would truthfully submit
their rates without looking out for their own interests. 17
In 1986, the banks asked the BBA to bring a measure of uniformity
into the market and to devise a benchmark to act as a reference for new
financial instruments, such as Forward Rate Agreements, that were
actively trading in the market. 18 Rather than negotiating the underlying
rate or forming rates by taking averages of ad-hoc panels, banks could
now use a standard rate. 19 This facilitated the operation of markets and
made benchmarking more transparent and objective. 20

11. LIBOR, Information About the London InterBank Offered Rate, GLOBAL-RATES,
available at http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/libor-information.aspx (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter LIBOR, global-rates].
12. Id.
13. Moore, supra note 3.
14. Id.; Landon Thomas, Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y.
TIMES (July 5, 2012), available at http://nytimes.com/2012/07/06/business/global/thegentlemens-club-that-sets-libor-is-called-into-question.html?pagewatned=all&_r=O
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
15. Thomas, Jr., supra note 14.
16. Moore, supra note 3; Thomas, Jr., supra note 14.
17. Moore, supra note 3.
18. Historical
Libor
Rates,
BBALIBOR,
available
at
http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspective (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
[hereinafter BBALIBOR]; Timeline: How the Libor scandal unfolded, TELEGRAPH (London)
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/liborscandal/9754981/Timeline-How-the-Libor-scandal-unfolded.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
19. BBALIBOR, supra note 18.
20. Id.
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At first, LIBOR was a benchmark for only a few currencies, which
included the American dollar, the British pound sterling, and the
Japanese yen. 21 Over the years, LIBOR expanded to include sixteen
currencies, but is presently a benchmark for only ten currencies. 22 To
date, regulators estimate that LIBOR supports more than $500 trillion
worth of financial instruments, ranging from simple mortgages to risky
derivative transactions, worldwide. 23
Currently, LIBOR is calculated in a similar way that Zombanakis
described. Each bank that is selected by the BBA answers the specific
question "at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market
size just prior to 11 a.m. ?"24 The bank then looks at its own financials,
looks at how much interest it would have to pay to borrow from another
bank, and submits a rate. 25 The BBA compiles all of the submissions
from the banks and presents the information to Thomson Reuters, a
global provider of business information. 26 Once Thomson Reuters
collects all of the rates from the panel banks, the highest and lowest
Then,
twenty-five percent of the submissions are eliminated. 27
Thompson Reuters takes an average of the remaining rates to produce
the official LIBOR rate. 28 As this process suggests, LIBOR must rely
on accurate and truthful submissions from each of the banks or LIBOR
will be skewed in one direction and the system will fail.
So why does it matter ifLIBOR is skewed in one direction? Well,
LIBOR is the primary way to measure the health of the banking system
worldwide. 29 Many banks will rely on this rate to determine the risk
involved with lending and "whether the other banks they do business

21. LIBOR, global-rates, supra note 11.
22. Id. The ten currencies are as follows: (1) American dollar, (2) Australian dollar, (3)
British pound sterling, (4) Canadian dollar, (5) Danish krone, (6) European euro, (7)
Japanese yen, (8) New Zealand dollar, (9) Swedish krona, and (10) Swiss franc. Id.
23. See Yuval Rosenberg, Libor-gate Explained: Why Barclays' Scandal Matters,
at
available
2012),
6,
(July
TIMES
FISCAL
http://www.thefiscatimes.com/Articles/2012/07 /06/Libor-gate-Explained-Why-BarclaysScandel-Matters.aspx#page 1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
24. BBALIBOR, supra note 18; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23 .
25. Moore, supra note 3; see also Rosenberg, supra note 23.
26. Moore, supra note 3.
27. Id.; see also Matthew Jensen, The Uses of LIBOR and the Victims of its
at
available
2012),
23,
(Aug.
AMERICAN
Primer,
A
Manipulation:
http://www.american.com/archive/2012/august/the-uses-of-libor-and-the-victims-of-itsmanipulation-a-primer (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
28. Moore, supra note 3.
29. Id.
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with are good for the money." 30 In simple terms, if LIBOR is high, it
means that banks do not believe the other banks are in good financial
health and are less likely to pay back loans that they will receive. 31 If
LIBOR is low, it makes the banking system look healthy and
creditworthy. 32 However, this correlation between LIBOR and financial
health may incentivize banks to submit lower rates. If a bank continues
to submit higher rates than its peers, which will be publicly available, it
may tip off the market that the bank is more risky or desperate for cash.
Once the market or investors obtain this information, they may invest
with other banks and cause banks submitting higher rates to lose
business. Therefore, if the majority of panel banks consistently
submitted low LIBOR rates, the remaining banks may underestimate
their true lending rate to refrain from reporting higher rates.
B. Who is Affected by LIBOR?

To many people, LIBOR may seem like financial jargon thrown
around by bankers at a cocktail party. However, LIBOR affects
virtually every common person who obtains a loan. 33 In the U.S., banks
have used LIBOR to set the borrowing rate for student loans,
adjustable-rate mortgages, and car loans. 34 In the U.K., many of the
same products rely on LIB OR. 35
For example, if a person has an adjustable-rate mortgage, it will
usually be tied to LIB OR. 36 With an adjustable-rate mortgage, a
borrower will lock in an interest rate, typically a low one, for a fixed
period. 37 Once that period ends, usually in three, five, or twelve
months, the mortgage rate resets to the current interest rate of the
index. 38 If LIBOR is lower when the mortgage rate resets, a borrower's
monthly payment will be lower; however, if LIBOR is higher, a

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27.
34. Moore, supra note 3; see also Jensen, supra note 27.
35. See BBALIBOR, supra note 18.
36. Donna Fuscaldo, Libor: What It Means/or US Consumer Loans, BANKRATE (Aug.
3, 2013), available at http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/libor-what-it-means-for-usconsumer-loans.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Kirsten Grind, What Libor Means
for
You,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
3,
2012),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000087239639044354550457756512072803 7852.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
37. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
38. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
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borrower's premium will rise. 39
The process is very similar for a person with student loans tied to
LIBOR. It is common for students to take out loans with a rate that is
LIBOR plus 2% or LIBOR plus 7%. 40 If a student signs a loan when
LIBOR is high, the loan repayment will be more expensive than if
LIBOR is low. In both cases, the loan rate rests on the foundation that
banks will submit honest and accurate LIBOR rates and will not
consider their own interests when making submissions.
Although inaccurate or dishonest submissions will affect LIBOR,
the change of LIB OR impacts an individual's finances differently. If an
individual has the financial security to handle increases in mortgage or
student loan premiums, an inyrease in LIBO R may not have a
substantial effect on the individual. However, for people who are
simply making mortgage or student loan payments and do not have the
financial wherewithal to deal with an increase in LIBOR, the effects
could be devastating. Therefore, a bank that is manipulating LIBOR,
either higher or lower, to stay aligned with the market or to affect
derivative positions, will drastically effect individuals who rely on
banks for trustworthy and well-founded financial instruments.
BARCLAYS BANK LIB OR MANIPULATION
This section provides an overview of the LIBOR manipulation
scandal presented through the recent investigations into Barclays Bank.
Part A describes Barclays's attempts to manipulate LIBOR. Part B
describes the violations found by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") under the Commodities Exchange Act and
provides a discussion of the settlement between Barclays and CFTC.
III.

A. Evidence of Manipulation
In the midst of the 2007 financial crisis, the credit markets began to
freeze up as banks began to suffer losses on their American subprime
mortgages. 41 As a result, banks were reluctant to lend to one another,
which led to shortages of the funding system worldwide. 42 As described
earlier, when banks are reluctant to lend to one another, a bank's
LIBOR submission will be higher and it will look less credit worthy to

39. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
40. Fuscaldo, supra note 36; see also Grind, supra note 36.
41. The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Rotten Heart of Finance].
42. Id.
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the market.
At the time of the financial cns1s, Barclays claimed it was
submitting "honest rates" and other banks were submitting suppressed
rates, this caused investors to question the financial health of Barclays. 43
However, the CFTC responded by instituting its own investigation into
Barclays and uncovered emails between Barclays' traders and traders in
other banks asking each other to artificially manipulate LIBOR. 44 Upon
the release of this information, Barclays admitted to manipulating its
LIBOR submissions so they were more aligned with the rates of rival
banks. 45 Barclays instructed its LIBOR submitters to submit numbers
that were high enough to be in the "top four" and thus discarded from
the calculation, but not so high as to draw attention to the bank.46 In its
defense, Barclays claimed that it informed the regulators and the Bank
of England that banks were submitting lower rates than they could
actually lend at, and Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of
England, authorized Barclays' suppressed submissions. 47
As the investigations continued, the CFTC found additional
evidence of Barclays manipulating LIBOR to not only keep its
submission in line with other panel banks, but also to benefit its
derivative positions in swaps and futures that were tied to LIBOR. 48
From January 2005 through May 2009, at least 173 requests for altered
LIBOR submissions were made to Barclays' submitters. 49 Depending
on the trader's derivative position, the requests asked for a higher or
lower LIBOR submission. 50 To put the manipulation in perspective, if
Barclays traders were able to affect the rate in their favor by only one
43 . Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Libor's Dirty Laundry, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07 /opinion/libors-dirty-laundry.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
46. Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 41; see also Nocera, supra note 45.
47. Barclays Reveals Bank of England Libor Phone Call Details, BBC NEWS (July 3,
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18695181 (last visited Oct. 13,
2013) [hereinafter Barclays Phone Call Details].
48. Id.
49. Lindsay Fortado & Silla Brush, Barclays Fined by UK., US. for Falsifying Libor
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
27,
2012),
available
at
Rates,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-27 /barclays-said-to-be-nearing-liborsettlement-with-fsa-cftc (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Dan Jones, 'Done . . .for You
Big Boy': The Barclays LIBOR Messages, INVESTMENTWEEK (June 27, 2012), available at
http://www.investmentweek.co. uk/investment-week/news/2187554/-done-for-boy-barclayslibor-messages (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
50. See Simone Foxman, How Barclays Made Money on LIBOR Manipulation, Bus.
INSIDER (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-barclays-mademoney-on-libor-manipulation-2012-7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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basis point, or .01 %, it would likely make the traders more than $2
million. 51 This amount of money created large incentives for traders to
manipulate the rate with untruthful and inaccurate submissions.
Additionally, many of these requests were personal favors between
traders; replies from LIBOR submitters included phrases such as "for
52
you, anything" and "done ... for you big boy." In another instance, a
trader thanked a Barclays LIBOR submitter by saying, "Dude. I owe
you big time! Come over one day after work and I'm opening a bottle of
54
Bollinger [champagne ]53 "
In essence, traders were helping each other make money at the cost
of ordinary borrowers of loans benchmarked on LIBOR. They asked
each other for favors, so it seemed personal. In the financial industry,
traders cut deals with each other all the time, 55 as maintaining
relationships with other banks is sometimes just as important as making
money. However, when traders negotiate with financial instruments
such as LIBOR submissions, an official benchmark and a prime
indicator for market health, they can drastically affect the lending
market and investors that rely on honest rates.

B. Barclays Violations of the Commodities Exchange Act
After the CFTC completed its investigation, the CFTC sanctioned
Barclays for three major violations. This section will explain each
violation and will conclude by discussing the Barclays settlement and
how it spawned additional investigations into other rival banks for
manipulating LIBOR.

C. Sanctions against Barclays
First, the CFTC alleged that Barclays made false, misleading, or
Section 9(a)(2) of the
knowingly inaccurate reports of LIBOR.
Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA") makes it unlawful for any person
"knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through
the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or
other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly
inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions
that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate

51. Id.
52. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49.
at
available
BOLLINGER,
CHAMPAGNE
53. See
bollinger.com/en_UK/welcome (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
54. Fortado & Brush, supra note 49; Jones, supra note 49.
55. Moore, supra note 3.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/6
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commerce. " 56 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays, through the
transmission of an electronic spreadsheet to Thompson Reuters,
knowingly delivered American dollar, Japanese yen, and British pound
sterling LIBOR submissions through the mail or interstate commerce
that contained market information concerning costs of borrowing,
liquidity conditions, and stress in the money markets. 57 Additionally,
Barclays's submissions were false, misleading, or knowingly inaccurate
because they were not based on costs of borrowing unsecured funds in
the pertinent markets, but rather were based on impermissible factors
such as: (1) the management directive to lower Barclays' submitted
rates to manage market and media perceptions of Barclays; and (2) the
derivatives positions of swaps traders. 58
Second, CFTC alleged that Barclays attempted to manipulate
LIBOR. Under section 9(a)(2) of the CEA, it is unlawful for "any
person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the
price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity." 59
Two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: ( 1) an
intent to affect the market price; and (2) an overt act in furtherance of
that intent. 60 Here, the CFTC found that Barclays traders specifical1li
intended to affect the price at which the daily rights would be fixed. 1
The fixings, accomplished by calling Barclays submitters and asking for
higher or lower submissions, were done in order to benefit the
derivative positions or to benefit the derivatives trading positions of
traders at other banks, with whom they actively coordinated. 62
Third, the CFTC alleged that the Barclays traders aided and abetted
traders at other banks to manipulate LIBOR. The CFTC alleged that the
Barclays swap traders and the traders at the other panel banks discussed
LIB OR submissions that would benefit each banks' respective
derivative trading positions. 63 The traders at other panel banks asked
56. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
57. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, As Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In the
Matter of: Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., (CFTC 2012) No.
12-25,
at
26,
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/en
fbarclaysorder062712.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter CFTC Order].
58. Id.
59. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
60. CFTC Order, supra note 57, at 26.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28.
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the Barclays swap traders to instruct the Barclays LIBOR submitters to
submit a certain rate, or submit a rate in a direction higher or lower, that
would benefit the derivatives' positions of the traders at other panel
banks. 64

D. Barclays Settlement and the Spawn of Global Investigations into
other Panel Banks
Almost immediately after the CFTC published its allegations,
Barclays paid over $450 million to three regulators in the U.S. and the
U.K., and its chairman, Marcus Agius, resigned. 65 Additionally,
Barclays Chief Executive Officer, Bob Diamond, and Chief Operating
Officer, Jerry Del Misser, stepped away from their positions without
taking 2012 bonuses. 66 However, after the CFTC report was published,
the evidence that Barclays' traders aided and abetted traders at other
banks to manipulate LIBOR spawned criminal investigations into other
banks' executives and the individuals that contributed to submitting
false interest rate data for setting the benchmark. 67 As noted by Gary
Gensler, the chairman of the CFTC, the Barclays LIBOR settlement
initiated global investigation into rate-rigging at more than a dozen big
banks that contributed to setting LIBOR during the period of
manipulation. 68
Additionally, the CFTC report initiated private lawsuits and class
actions against the panel banks that made submissions to set LIBOR.
Collusion among banks to fix LIBOR, either higher or lower, can have
an enormous effect on a number of sectors, so there is a vast pool of
potential victims who can seek compensation. 69 As stated by Steve
Berman, managing partner for Hagens Berman, "[ w ]hile the settlement
with the CFTC does punish Barclays and other banks, it does little to
address the losses of perhaps thousands of investors who were

64. Id.
65. Moore, supra note 3; see also Sara Schaefer Munoz & Max Colchester, Top
Officials at Barclays Resign Over Rate Scandal, WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304299704577503974000425002.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
66. Munoz & Colchester, supra note 65.
67. Peter J. Henning, What the Barclays Settlement Means for Other Banks,
DEALBOOK (July 3, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/whatsnext-after-the-barclays-settlement/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
68. Ben Protess, Libor Case Energies a Wall Street Watchdog, DEALBOOK (Aug. 12,
2012, 8:57 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/libor-case-energizesgensler-and-the-c-f-t-c/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
69. Id.
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financially harmed by the conspiracy." 70 Therefore, investigations into
other panel banks and private lawsuits will continue into the foreseeable
future.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF MANIPULATION AMONG LIBOR
SUBMITTING BANKS

This section discusses the evidence suggesting that panel banks
colluded to manipulate LIBOR during the 2007 and 2008 financial
cns1s.
As stated earlier, the Barclays settlement initiated an
overwhelming number of private lawsuits and class actions. Many of
these actions will rely on the following allegations to build their cases.
Part A will discuss evidence supporting that panel banks artificially
suppressed LIBOR. Part B will describe the discrepancy between
LIBOR and Eurodollar deposit rates. Part C will provide evidence that
LIBOR quotes "bunched" around the fourth lowest quote.

A. Evidence Supporting that Panel Banks Artificially Suppressed
LIBOR
As previously discussed, LIBOR is a calculation of how much
interest each bank would have to pay to borrow from another bank or a
bank's borrowing costs. However, LIBOR is not the only method of
calculating a bank's borrowing costs. Certain statistics, such as the
probability of default, calculate the degree of likelihood that the
borrower of a loan or debt will not be able to make the necessary
scheduled repayments. 71 These calculations are estimated on a daily
basis by analyzing each banks equity and bond prices, accounting
information, and general economic conditions (i.e. interest rates,
unemployment rates, and inflation rates). 72 These factors are essentially
the same factors used when determining LIBOR submissions.
Therefore, one would assume that the two statistics, LIBOR and
probability of default, which account for the same economic factors and
measure a bank's lending rate, would have a positive coefficient.
However, during the financial crisis, these rates were in opposition. As

70. Press Release, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Hagens Berman Files Class
Action Against Barclays Bank, Others Over Euribor Rate Fixing (July 6, 2012), available at
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/hagens-berman-files-class-action-againstbarclays-bank-others-over-euribor-rate-fixing-161635455 .html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014 ).
71. Default
Probability,
INVESTOPEDIA,
(2013),
available
at
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/defaultprobability.asp#axzz2B 118WVXm (last visited
on Oct. 8, 2013).
72. See generally Jens Hilscher et al., Measuring the Risk: A Modern Approach, 90
RMA J. 60 (2008).
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seen from the figures below, which list all panel banks that submitted
LIBOR rates in 2007 and 2008, the correlation coefficients were
negative.
To put these coefficients in perspective, if one variable is
increasing and the other is also increasing then the correlation is
"positive."73 However, if the variables diverge in opposite directions,
then the correlation "negative." 74 Finding a negative coefficient
between a bank's daily LIBOR quotes and the daily probabilities of
default suggests that as the probability of default increases, the LIBOR
quotes decreases. However, that would violate fundamental finance
theory because both LIBOR and probability of default are based on the
same economic factors. If both rates are based on the same economic
factors, then both statistics should move in the same direction and
display a positive coefficient. However, as displayed by the graphs
below, the probability of default and LIBOR quotes throughout the
financial crisis display a negative coefficient. This was true for every
LIBOR submitting bank, except HSBC, in both 2007 and 2008.
Additionally, the same negative coefficient resurfaces regardless of
whether the data is spread over a one-month, a three-month, or a
twelve-month term. This disregards any possibility of coincidence
between the two statistics. Therefore, this would suggest that banks are
suppressing LIBOR quotes to avoid revealing the higher rates that
reflect the true (higher) probabilities of default.
FIGURE 1
Graph 1: Correlation Coefficients Between Each Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and Probability
of Default (PD), One-Month Term

(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.)

73. A. K. SHARMA, TEXT BOOK OF CORRELATIO NS AND REGRESSION 5 (2005).
74. Id.
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FIGURE 2
Graph 2: Correlation Coefficients BetweenEach Bank's Daily LIBOR Bid and P1·obability
of Default (PD), Three-Month Term
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(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of KamakuraRisk Information Services.)

FIGURE 3
Graph 4: Correlation CoefficientsBetweenEach Bank's Daih· LIBOR Bid and Pa·obabilitv
of Default (PD). Twelve-Month Term
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(Note: PDs are estimated daily using the reduced form model of Kamakura Risk Information Services.)

B. Evidence Supporting a Discrepancy Between LIBOR and
Eurodollar Deposit Rates
The Eurodollar deposit rates are analogous to LIBOR because they
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reflect the rates at which banks in the London Eurodollar money market
lend American dollars to one another, just as LIBOR is intended to
reflect rates at which panel banks in the London interbank market lend
American dollars to one another. 75 Economic and statistical analysis
strongly supports the Federal Reserve Eurodollar Deposit rate as an
accurate benchmark for measuring the validity of LIBOR as reported by
the panel banks. 76 Furthermore, because LIBOR and Eurodollar
Deposit Rates measure the lending cost to banks of Eurodollar deposits,
consider important market and financial fundamentals (i.e. monetary
policy, market risk, and interest rates), and incorporate risk factors,
absent manipulation, the spread between the rates should always be zero
or close to zero. 77 However, that was not the case.
As seen in Figures 4 and 5, from January 5, 2000, to about August
7, 2007, the spread remained positive and very close to zero. However,
from August 8, 2007, through May 17, 2010, which is the time period of
alleged manipulation, the spread became negative and reached levels of
negative 35 basis points. Additionally, during the two-week period
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the spread reached levels
as high as 153 basis points. Therefore, this evidence demonstrates that
the panel banks were suppressing their LIBOR quotes and colluding to
suppress LIBOR.
FIGURE 4
Figure 3: BBA LIBOR Federal Reserve Eurodollar Spread in

75. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1 68, In Re Libor-Based
Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) MDR No. 2262,
available at http://www.hausfeldllp.com/content_documents/9/Stamped-LIBOR-OTCPlaintiffs-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id.
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FIGURE 5

Bank Name

Average Spread between
September 16, 2008 and
September 30, 2008

Average Spread between
August 8, 2007 and
May 17,2010

1.Bank ofTokyo-Mitsb.

-120 basis points

-25 basis points

2. Bank of America

-144 basispoints

-30 basis points

3. Barclays

-87 basis points

-25 basis points

4. Citi

-142 basis points

-32 basis points

cs

-122 basis points

-27 basis points

6. Deutsche Bank

-129 basis points

-31 basis points

7. HBOS

-110 basis points

-29 basis points

8. HSBC

-141 basis points

-32 basis points

9. JP MorganChase

-153 basis points

-35 basis points

10. Lloyds

-146 basis points

-30 basis points

11. NorinBank

-126 basis points

-25 basis points

12. Rabo Bank

-143 basis points

-32 basis points

13. Royal Bank of Canada

-140 basis points

-28 basis points

14. Royal Bank of Scotland

-140 basis points

-26 basis points

15. UBS

-141 basispoints

-29 basis points

16. West

-138 basis points

-35 basis points

5.

C. L/BOR Quotes "Bunched" Around the Fourth Lowest Quote
Supports Manipulation
Because of the way LIBOR is calculated, by discarding the four
highest and lowest reported rates and averaging the remainder, if a
number of banks sought to act in concert to depress LIBOR, evidence
would display a strong concentration around the fourth-lowest rate. 78
During the time period when LIBOR was allegedly suppressed,
evidence demonstrates that the banks, specifically Citigroup, Bank of
78. Id. at 55.
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America, and JP Morgan Chase, submitted rates that displayed
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth lowest quote. 79 This can be
seen from Figure 6 below. After compiling all the banks LIBOR
submissions, quotes tend to "bunch" around the fourth-lowest spread.
However, when comparing this data against I-year CDS spreads, which
is also an indicator of a bank's financial health, the CDS spreads do not
"bunch" around the fourth-lowest rate and are more evenly distributed.
It is well established that "if banks were truthfully quoting their costs,
we would expect these distributions to be similar," 80 which is not the
case here. Following the same reasoning described with LIBOR and
probabilities of default stated earlier, if two statistics are based on the
same economic factors, their results should be similar. If not, the results
would disprove basic economic theory. Therefore, the LIBOR rates
suspicious "bunching" around the fourth-lowest rate, while CDS
spreads are evenly distributed, suggest manipulation between
submitting banks.
FIGURE 6
1 Year CDS Spreads

1 Year Libor Quotes
Zi

·f

•, 5
0
.5
1
1.5
2
Differencefrom the Fourth Lowest pread

V.

-1

-.5

0

5

1

1.5

2

Difference from
the Fourth
Lowest Quote

REFORM OF LIBOR: THE WHEATLEY REVIEW

Martin Wheatley, a top U.K. regulator for the Financial Service
79. Id.
80. Connan Andrew Snider & Thomas Y oule, Does the Libor Reflect Banks'
Borrowing Costs?, Soc. Sci. Res. NETWORK (Apr. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.econ.umn.edu/-youleOOI/libor_4_01_10.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
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Authority ("FSA"), conducted an investigation of possible reforms to
the LIBOR calculation method in order to prevent another manipulation
scandal. Part A of this section will begin by presenting Wheatley' s
findings, and then Part B will introduce his recommendations for
reform. Finally, Part C will share immediate reactions to Wheatley's
report. If Wheatley's proposal is adopted, it will be included in the
financial services reform bill. 81 This bill is before parliament and is
scheduled to receive royal assent next year. 82

A. Initial Findings From the Wheatley Report
Wheatley's preliminary recommendation is to reform the current
LIBOR system rather than implement a full replacement benchmark
rate. 83 In order to replace the benchmark entirely, one must prove that:
(1) LIBOR is beyond repair; (2) LIBOR is subject to a better alternative
that existed in this moment in time; and, critically, (3) an immediate and
smooth transition to that alternative could be made. 84 Wheatley
concluded that none of these conditions were met and found that a
reform would be a more realistic solution than a full overhaul. 85 Due to
the overwhelming number of financial instruments benchmarked on the
current LIBOR system, a move to replace LIBOR would "pose an
unacceptably high risk of significant financial instability" and cause
large-scale litigation between parties holding contracts that reference
LIBOR. 86 Additionally, throughout the current manipulation scandal,
"there has been no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR by market
participants. " 87 This signals that the market has not lost complete
confidence in the current benchmark rate and that a wholesale
replacement of LIBOR would be an overreaction to the current
situation.
81. See Brooke Masters, Libor to be Regulated 'Without Delay', FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2012, 4:31 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6d20d018-1865-l le2-80e900144feabdc0.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
82. Id.
83. Martin Wheatley, Managing Director, Pushing the Reset Button on LIBOR, FSA
available
at
(Sept.
28,
2012),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml (last visited
Oct. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Martin Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of Libor: Final Report 7, GOV.UK
available
at
(2012),
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1917 62/whea
tley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Wheately,
Final Report].
87. Id.
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B. Wheatley 's Recommendations for LIB OR Reform
After Wheatley decided to maintain the current LIBOR system, he
proposed three major changes to regain trust in the benchmark rate and
prevent another large-scale manipulation. 88
First, Wheatley suggested that the British Bankers' Association
("BBA") hand over the authority to regulate LIBOR to the FSA. 89 The
current manipulation scandal, occurring over a lengthy period of time,
provides evidence that the BBA failed to properly oversee the LIBORsetting process and should take no further role in the administration and
governance of LIBOR. 90 Once authority is transferred, the FSA should
institute an independent committee headed by the FSA' s approved
persons. 91 The committee's obligation would include: surveillance and
scrutiny of submissions; publication of a statistical digest of rate
submissions; and periodic reviews addressing the issue of whether
LIBOR continues to meet market needs effectively and credibly. 92
Second, Wheatley suggested that the FSA' s independent
committee institute a clear, consistent, and effective regulatory regime
that underpins all activity. 93 This would include the authority to write
and implement rules in relation to the LIBOR process, supervise the
conduct of the firms and individuals involved in the process ... and "take
regulatory action for misconduct." 94 The independent committee would
require increased transparency from banks by mandating LIBOR
submissions be explicitly supported by transactional data that properly
identifies the bank's current lending rate. 95 Additionally, if banks
continue to manipulate LIBOR, the FSA' s independent committee
would be able to impose public censure or financial penalty. 96
Third, Wheatley suggested that the government should amend
current legislation to allow the FSA to "prosecute manipulation or
attempted manipulation. " 97 This would enable the FSA to use criminal
powers for the worst cases of attempted manipulation. 98 Currently, the
FSA only has statutory powers to investigate various offenses under the
88. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 12.
93. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
94. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 16.
95 . Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Wheatley, Pushing the Reset Button, supra note 83.
98. Id.
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Financial Services Market Act 2000 and insider dealing under the
Criminal Justice Act 1993. 99 Therefore, the FSA is not in a position to
investigate and prosecute LIBOR manipulation. 100 Although Wheatley
noted that introducing criminal sanctions for LIBOR submissions might
create overlap with existing fraud offenses, create financial uncertainty,
and unintentionally criminalize unrelated activities, the civil sanctions
may not be sufficient to deter the large financial benefits that might be
obtained from manipulating LIBOR. 101

C. Immediate Reaction to the Wheatley Review
In his review, Wheatley stated, "in relation to the question of
whether administering LIBOR should become a regulated activity, most
of the responses addressing this issue were in favor of regulation." 102
Following the report, banking trade bodies, politicians, lawyers, and
buy-side representatives confirmed his opinion and were in favor of
regulation. 1 3 Andrew Tyrie, who is leading the government-mandated
probe into banking standards in the U.K., stated that "[t]he Wheatley
Review is a welcome initial step ... it has rightly stripped the BBA of
responsibility for LIBOR . . . brings LIBOR within the scope of
regulatory oversight and criminal law . . . and ensure[ s] that LIBOR
can't be rigged again." 104 Additionally, Simon Lewis, Chief Executive
of the Global Financial Markets Association, said, "the Wheatley
Review is timely and outlines clear recommendations for change ...
[GFMA] believes that all systemically important financial benchmarks
should be subject to regulatory oversight." Furthermore, the BBA
released a statement saying, "the BBA has strongly stated the need for
greater regulatory oversight of LIBOR and tougher sanctions for those
who try to manipulate it." 105

99. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Wheatley Review: Reactionfrom the City, FIN. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), available
at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-09-28/martin-wheatley-libor-report-city-oflondon-reaction (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Reaction From City].
104. Id.
105. Press Release, British Bankers' Association, BBA Statement on Conclusions of
Wheatley
Review
into
LIBOR
(Sept.
28,
2012),
available
at
http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-statement-on-conclusions-of-wheatley-reviewinto-libor (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
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PROBLEMS WITH WHEATLEY'S REGULATION
SCHEME
This section discusses why Wheatley' s proposed regulation
scheme fails to account for the current financial structures among banks.
Wheatley's proposed scheme is another increased transparency and
regulation scheme that is instituted only after the damage occurred.
Evidence will show that Wheatley' s regulation scheme fails to address
the collusion problem between the banks. Without addressing these
problems, banks will continue to act in their best interest regardless of
the sanctions or regulatory systems imposed.
VI.

A. Failure to Address Vague Definitions
After the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a trend in favor of
increased financial regulation. 106 However, to this day, four years after
the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, many of these
regulation schemes still have not been implemented. Additionally, in
the view of many scholars, many of the recent financial regulation
schemes have been far from successful. 107 The prominent explanation
for this delay is that in many of these regulations the wording and
definitions are too vague and, if left alone, would lead to expansive
regulation. 108 To solve this problem, regulating bodies continue to work
together to interpret the legislations' intent which has only pushed back
the date which regulation will take effect.
Wheatley's proposal runs into many of the same problems. For
example, Wheatley proposes that "the new regulated activities should
be defined in such a way as to cover the production of the submissions,
the calculation of the benchmark, ... systems and controls regarding ...

106. Letter from KPMG, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY PRACTICE LETTER (2010),
available at http://kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/regulatorypractice-letters/Documents/rpl-1013-otc-derivatives.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013); Mike
Colodny, Federal Reserve Board: Testimony of J. Nellie Liang, Director of Financial
Stability Policy and Research, on the Financial Oversight Council, given on April 14, 2011 ,
at
available
2011),
1,
(June
LAWYERS.COM
http://govemment.lawyers.com/blogs/archives/ 13638-Federal-Reserve-Board-Testimony-ofJ.-Nellie-Liang,-Director-of-Financial-Stability-Policy-and-Research,-on-the-FinancialOversight-Council,-given-on-April-14,-2011.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (providing
evidence through the Dodd-Frank Act, EMIR, and Volcker Rule that the response of the
2008 financial crisis was increased financial regulation).
107. See Mercatus Scholars on the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, MERCATUS
CENTER, available at http://mercatus.org/features/mercatus-scholars-comment-dodd-frankfinancial-reform-bill (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
108. Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End
Too Big to Fail? , 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. Rev. 1, 27 (2012).
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the processes for identifying and querying suspicious submissions." 109
However, Wheatley fails to give any guidance on how to actually define
these tasks. He does not include any factors that should be considered
when producing submissions or calculating the benchmark; rather, he
states that calculations should be "market led" to adapt to current
market conditions. 110
Furthermore, to increase transparency, Wheatley suggests that
LIBOR submissions should be explicitly and transparently supported by
transactional data. 111 Unlike his definition requirement discussed
above, Wheatley gives "LIBOR submissions guidelines" which set out
the specific transactional data that contributing firms should use to
determine their assessment of their interbank lending. 112 However, to
provide flexibility for submitters when transactional data is unavailable,
Wheatley asks submitters to "use their experience of the inter-bank
deposit market and its relationships with other markets," and allows
adjustment based on "interpolation or extrapolation from available
data." 113 In other words, if the bank is actually carrying out unsecured
inter-bank deposit transactions then it should use that transactional data
to support its submissions. If not, which commonly occurs, banks are
still able to use their judgment based on "experience," "relationships,"
and "research" of market data. 114 In essence, Wheatley trusts traders
with discretionary power to make honest and accurate submissions
when trading data is unavailable to support submissions. These are the
same factors that created the opportunity for manipulation in the first
place.
Therefore, Wheatley fails to give specific intentions for definitions
within the regulation scheme, which will lead to overregulation and
delay implementation. Further, where Wheatley attempts to provide
definitions, opportunities for continued manipulation remain blatantly

109. Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 13 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 27.
112. Id.at28.
113. Matt Levine, It's the Beginning of the End for Danish Kroner Libor,
DEALBREAKER (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://dealbreaker.com/2012/09/its-thebeginning-of-the-end-for-danish-kronerliborl?utmsource=feedburner&utmmedium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dealbreaker+
dealbreaker+%28Dealbreaker°/o29&utm_ content=Google+Reader (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
114. See id.; see also Richard E. Farley, The Future of L/BOR- The Final Reportfrom
Paul
Hastings
LLP
1,2
(2012),
available
at
the
Wheatley
Review,
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2260.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2013).
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evident.
B. Failure to Address Banking Culture
As stated earlier, evidence suggesting banks were colluding to
manipulate LIBOR spawned Wheatley's investigation. Collusion is an
agreement amongst competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on
interfirm communication or transfers. 115 The suppression of interfirm
rivalry leads to firms earning monopoly profits. 116 Here, evidence
suggested that banks, which usually compete within the industry,
colluded with each other to suppress rivalry and enhance profits. 117
Wheatley's solution to this problem is to "increase transparency" and
"impose criminal sanctions." 118
However, Wheatley overlooks the fact that a culture was created
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. Only
increasing transparency and instituting criminal sanctions fails to
properly address this problem. One should consider the following.
First, although other benchmark rates exist that could substitute
LIBOR, in the wake of the biggest manipulation scandal to date, there
was no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR. 119 This suggests that
these colluding banks experience no threat of substitutes to other
benchmark rates and will still control the vast amount of financial
instruments within the market through LIBOR. In essence, they have a
monopoly among investors within the LIBOR market.
Second, as stated earlier, Wheatley's submission platform leaves
opportunity for LIBOR submitters to make submissions based on their
own judgment from "experience," "relationships," and "research" of
market data. This is the same situation for LIBOR submitters when
they were completely unregulated before the Wheatley report.
Therefore, as long as potential profits outweigh the potential sanction or
fines, Wheatley's suggestions will not change the colluding nature
around LIBOR because major threats to the benchmark rate are absent
and opportunities for manipulation are still available.
Now, what would be the immediate response to such an argument?
Make sure Wheatley' s sanctions or criminal penalties are high enough
to deter banks from colluding to manipulate LIBOR. However, if

115. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELLS AND BIDDING RINGS VIII (2012).
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 5.
See Foxman, supra note 50.
Wheatley, Final Report, supra note 86, at 18.
See id. at 7.
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opportunities arise, which they will, where LIBOR rates are based on
trader's "experience," "relationships," and "research" of market data,
then it will be very difficult for regulatory bodies to impose criminal
sanctions without a bank admitting its wrongdoing like Barclays.
However, the current regulatory structure and the profitable business
relationship between banks makes such a situation very unlikely.
First, the regulatory structure makes an admission of manipulation
unlikely. The ability of the bank to maximize personal benefit is based
on the ability to predict what the other side will do in response to either
abiding by the regulations or manipulating LIBOR. 120 Given that in
almost all cases the regulatory body has less funds, personnel,
resources, and expertise than its bank counterparts, there is little to be
gained in the long run by cooperating, and much to be gained by
maximizing its own benefit. 121 Therefore, if the regulatory body does
not have the means to properly overlook every submission of banks,
submissions may continue to be manipulated to maximize personal
gam.
Second, the relationship between banks makes an admission of
manipulation unlikely. The banks involved in submitting LIBOR rates
are amongst the biggest and most respected banks in the world. 122 In
addition, LIBOR submitting banks participate in a vast amount of
financial transactions with each other. If one bank was to report
manipulation of another bank, it may jeopardize a working business
relationship. Sacrificing a business relationship, especially a profitable
one, would likely outweigh the choice to come forward to comply with
Wheatley' s regulation scheme.
Therefore, Wheatley's proposed criminal sanctions will not affect
the banking culture and incentives to collude in the long run.
VII.

PROPOSAL FOR LIBOR REFORM

This section provides insight on a possible solution to
shortcomings within the LIBOR system and Wheatley's proposal. Part
A will characterize the present regulator-regulatee system that is
currently in place and explain why only regulation will not be sufficient.
Afterwards, Part B will explain a possible solution to alter the
120. DAVID RUBENS Assoc., THE REGULATORY SYSTEM WHY IS IT FAILING? 1, 7
(2012),
available
at
http://www.davidrubensassociates.com/PDFS/DRA_The%20Regulatoty°/o20System%20%20Why%20Is%20It%20Failing_Aug2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
121. Id.
122. Top IO Investment Banks, BANKS AROUND THE WORLD, available at
http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/top-investment-banks (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
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regulatory structure.
A. LIBOR Regulation and Modern Day Game Theory
As explained earlier, Wheatley proposed a regulatory structure that
would place all LIBOR submitting banks under the governance of the
FSA. However, the supervisory role of the regulatory bodies, with
threat of punitive action, only creates a modem day game theory and
makes collusion among banks the optimal solution.
Game theory attempts to look at the relationships between
123
participants in a particular model and predict their optimal decisions.
The most well-known example is the prisoner's dilemma. 124 For
example, imagine that two prisoners are offered the opportunity to
either deny a charge or give evidence against the other one. 125 If both
Prisoner A and Prisoner B stay silent, they each receive one month
imprisonment. 126 If they both provide evidence against the other, they
each receive three months imprisonment. 127 However, if one prisoner
rats on the other, who in tum stays silent, then the prisoner who gives
the evidence goes free, and the prisoner who was betrayed receives one
year imprisonment. 128
It is well recognized that the optimal strategy in the above situation
is to give evidence against the other person. 129 Although both sides
would attain a lower sentence if they stayed silent, the prisoners have no
130
control over each other's actions and will give up each other.
However, the optimal strategy changes if the prisoners can adjust their
strategy based on previous experience. This is a more practical view for
comparison with the financial regulatory structure. In such a situation,
commonly identified as 'tit for tat,' the optimal strategy would be to
repeat what the other party did on the first occasion. If the first choice
was to cooperate, then continue to cooperate. If the first choice was to

at
available
lNVESTOPEDIA,
Theory,
123. Game
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gametheory.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
at
available
LEARNER,
ANNENBERG
Dilemma,
Prisoner's
124. See
http://www.learner.org/courses/mathilluminated/units/9/textbook/04.php (last visited Sept.
20, 2013); DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note 120, at 6.
125. ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
130. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
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betray, then continue to betray. 131
Here, strong evidence supports the conclusion that LIBOR
submitting banks have been "cooperating" for an extended period of
time. As seen in the 'tit for tat' theory, it is mutually beneficial for all
parties involved to continue to "cooperate." However, unlike the
prisoners in the example who seek less jail time, "mutually beneficial"
for LIBOR submitting banks equals extraordinary financial gains.
Additionally, the incentive to "cooperate" only increases if one includes
the fact that most regulators are less funded and resource intensive than
the majority of LIBOR submitting banks. If regulators cannot provide
funds for proper supervision or banks realize they are more likely to get
away with manipulation than face punitive damages, then banks will
only continue to "cooperate." Therefore, a regulatory structure must be
instituted that creates a situation that makes LIBOR submitting banks
"betray" each other rather than "cooperate."
B. Creation of a "Whistle Blowing" Incentive System

As stated above, if banks are not deterred from cooperating then
financial regulations will be ineffective. However, a "whistle blowing"
incentive system incorporated within Wheatley's proposed regulatory
scheme could tum the LIBOR submitting banks against each other.
A similar program was instituted within the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act, which rewards 10 to 30 percent of monetary
sanctions for whistleblowers who report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") original information leading to securities law
enforcement actions that recover more than $1 million. 132 As a result,
the SEC reported that the "whistle blowing" program received 3,001
formal written whistleblower "tips" seeking consideration for an award
in 2012 (excluding tips that reported alleged violations that were
received from persons who were ineligible to receive a bounty). 133
Here, if a similar "whistle blower" program was instituted, the
131. See ANNENBERG LEARNER, supra note 124; DAVID RUBENS Assoc., supra note
120, at 7.
132. Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act's Robust Whist/eh/owing Incentives,
FORBES
(Apr.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011 /04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robustwhistleblowing-incentives/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
133. Scott J. Wenner, United States: SEC Report Confirms Substantial Dodd-Frank
Whistle-Blowing Activity, lllustrating Need for Employers To Be Proactive - And Careful,
MONDAQ
(Nov.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/208852/Whistleblowing/SEC+Report+Confirms+Su
bstantial+DoddFrank+WhistleBlowing+Activity+Illustrating+Need+For+Employers+To+B
e+Proactive+And+Careful (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
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dynamic between the regulator and a LIBOR submitting bank would be
altered. Banks would no longer be subjected to possible punitive
damages from the regulators, but they also could be subjected to
"whistle blowing" claims made by other banks or players in the
industry. Additionally, if "whistle blowing" incentives are comparable
to the gains made by manipulating LIBOR, banks would be more likely
to "blow the whistle." LIBOR submitting banks would be able to make
similar short term profits by tipping regulators of misconduct, but would
do so without apprehension of their own misconduct. Such a program
would incentivize LIBOR submitting banks to betray each other and
"blow the whistle" rather than "cooperate."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The LIBOR manipulation scandal is considered one of the biggest
scandals the financial world has seen to date. While in 1960, when
LIBOR was instituted, an unregulated system to set the world's largest
benchmark for lending may have been acceptable, it is clear that
structural changes are needed. The evidence presented in this Note
points not only to a couple greedy individuals looking to make a quick
buck (or million), but an industry wide manipulation, that included
some of the most powerful corporations within the financial industry.
Additionally, as this Note has illustrated, the manipulation did not just
affect the financial markets, but had devastating effects to almost every
person that went to the bank and took out a loan.
Wheatley's proposal is a much-needed step. LIBOR needs to be
heavily regulated to prevent a scandal like this from ever happening
again. However, Wheatley' s proposal does not fix the problem and
contains multiple shortcomings. First, a banking culture was created
amongst banks to collude with each other to maximize profits. If this
culture is not altered, banks will just look to other ways to make money
to compensate for any sanction a regulatory body will impose.
Additionally, most, if not all, of these banks engage in a vast amount of
financial transactions together and reporting partner banks' attempted
manipulation may jeopardize these relationships. Second, Wheatley
leaves room for submitters to use their own "experience" and
"relationships" to set LIBOR. In effect, Wheatley gives LIBOR
submitters large discretion for setting the rate, which is exactly what
created the opportunity for manipulation.
To solve these problems, this Note has discussed an incentive
program to change the structure between financial regulators and the
LIBOR submitting banks. If a system is implemented that makes it
more or equally profitable to "blow the whistle" than collude, future
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/6
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manipulation will be prevented.
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